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Abstract 
Americans are working much longer hours in the paid labour market than workers in Western 
Europe. Much of the debate focuses on whether this is the result of voluntary worker choice 
or whether this is a decision imposed on workers by their employers. This paper shows that 
American hours of work have become more or less stabilised as a result of the rising intensity 
of advertising in the U.S.: advertising may raise the desired amount of marketed goods and 
services for which workers find it necessary to work long hours.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper advances the view that the intensity of creation of wants through 
advertising and marketing might be an influence on decisions made by Americans about how 
much time they should devote to paid work, and how much time to leisure. The record shows 
that the nineteenth century witnessed a sharp decline in hours of work in the face of rising 
real wages. The decline continued in the twentieth century, but by the second half of the 
century, the decline was much diminished. Towards the end of the century the decline had 
largely been eliminated, with some evidence that working hours actually increased over the 
last quarter of the twentieth century. 
This relationship was investigated over the twentieth century up to 1976 by Brack and 
Cowling [1983], but they obviously missed the last development. Whilst causing some minor 
ripples in the literature the paper failed to have any wider impact: the significant and robust 
relationship between hours of work and the intensity of advertising revealed by this research 
seemed generally to be ignored by the profession. In a sense this was not surprising. 
Advertising was not seen, and is not seen, by the profession as terribly important in the 
workings of the major elements of the economy.1 It may affect the market share for Kelloggs 
cornflakes, but it was unlikely even to effect the demand for cornflakes in total, never mind 
hours of work. Such was the prevailing wisdom within economics, and this seems to be true 
in mainstream economics today: obviously there are economists who feel otherwise, 
especially within industrial organisation and business research. However, even here there 
appears to be a reluctance to address the possible macroeconomic consequences. 
Needless to say we feel very differently, and we are of the opinion that more research 
effort should be expended on probing these possible effects. Advertising in general, the broad 
sweep of marketing effort to shape the nature of demand, is a major characteristic of the 
modern firm, and it is getting more important. Unless mainstream economics begins to 
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recognise this we may be prone to misinterpret many events and phenomena. This may be the 
case so far as labour supply is concerned. Prescott [2004] has very recently drawn our 
attention to the huge differences in hours worked in the United States and Western Europe; 
see also Gordon [2002], Blanchard [2004] and Craft [2004]: productivity levels (output per 
hour worked) are roughly similar in western Europe and the U.S., with the U.K. below and 
France above the U.S. level. However GDP per person in Western Europe stands at only 70% 
of the level in the U.S., which remains unchanged on the relative position a quarter century 
previously. It seems fairly clear that while the gap in productivity between Europe and the 
U.S. has been largely eliminated, the gap in output per person is the same as it was in the 
seventies. Prescott [2002, 2004] identifies this as a gap in “prosperity”, a loss in welfare in 
Europe which is explicable in terms of lower hours worked due to higher marginal tax rates 
on labour income and consumption. If Europe were to adopt similar taxes on work and 
consumption then hours of work in Europe would be similar to the U.S., and Europe would 
observe a similar prosperity to that in the U.S. today: for example Prescott calculates that if 
France were to reduce its effective tax rate on labour income from its present level of 60% to 
the U.S. level of 40%, the welfare of the French people would increase by 19%.2 
We would argue that the main difference between Europe and the United States is 
that, whilst Europe has used some of the increased productivity over the last quarter-century 
to increase leisure rather than income, the United States has not done this, but continues to 
work roughly the same hours. Workers in the United States may be discouraged from taking 
more leisure because of the pressure on them to raise material consumption. We examine the 
half-century of U.S. history since the Second World War and find that the level of advertising 
has expanded considerably: real advertising expenditure rose more than seven fold, nearly 
four-fold when measured per capita. (In contrast the level in France was only one-tenth of 
that in the U.S., European Audiovisual Observatory: Statistical Year Book (1985 – 2001)) 
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The rest of the paper is set out as follows. The next section discusses trends in 
working time with particular reference to advertising. Section II discusses alternative 
explanations of the trends in working time. In Section III, a statistical framework is 
introduced and justified and the empirical results reported. Section IV and V contain some 
discussion and conclusion, respectively. 
 
II. Advertising and Hours of Work 
Our argument is that advertising in general, the marketing effort to change the nature 
of demand, will result in additional material consumption, which, initially, will provide extra 
pleasure, but this is usually only a transitory consequence. The higher level of satisfaction 
from additional material goods wears off as more and more effective marketing efforts catch 
us in a larger web of wants and desires. Satisfaction thus depends on continued increasing 
consumption levels and conflicts with the desire for leisure time. 
This provides a solution to our problem, but also to one of Duesenberry’s [1967] 
problems: he asked the same question as we pose today, why do people (Americans) continue 
to work such long hours? (and relatedly, why do they (Americans) save so little, in the face of 
so much insecurity?). His own view relates to his own theory consumption which is based on 
interdependent preferences: to the question, why the drive to higher levels of consumption? 
He offers the demonstration effect. But if the demonstration effect is to lead to higher levels 
of consumption then we must presuppose its existence: emulation can go either way, to 
yuppy or hippy, conspicuous consumption or conspicuous non-consumption. Duesenberry 
relies on the “character of our culture” (American), but our argument raises the question of 
the endogeneity of its character within the economic system: advertising and product 
innovation, the characteristics of the modern economy, could provide the key to unlocking 
Duesenberry’s problem. Duesenberry [1967, p.105] himself “was doubtful advertising 
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explains the phenomenon before us”, and he devoted very little attention to it (just 15 lines of 
text). We remain unconvinced with his dismissal: advertising could be seen as creating a 
continuing dissatisfaction with present consumptions and this fits in well with the happiness 
literature: happiness does not appear to be related to personal consumption. Over the period 
from the 1940’s to the mid-nineties “very happy people” remained at 30% of the population 
of Americans, despite the large growth in material consumption over this period, Kenny 
[1999]. The recent evidences on happiness and work-life balance by Blanchflower and 
Oswald [2004] confirmed that the U.S. has the most severe problem with work-life balance.3 
In the U.S. there has been a steady decline in job satisfaction since 1970s. 
And so to labour supply: if advertising creates a continuing dissatisfaction with 
current levels of consumption, people may be encouraged to offer a larger fraction of their 
time for the generation of income in order to satisfy their increased demands for material 
consumption (despite its purely transitory effect on satisfaction). Labour supply will be 
affected by the pressure to consume. We then have a ready explanation for the slowing-down 
in the rate of decline of the work week and work year. Americans may not want more time 
off because they may want to consume more market goods than the Europeans. Despite a 
substantial increase in real wages over the second half of the twentieth century, U.S. workers 
have chosen not to take significantly more leisure time to enjoy higher living standards. (In 
contrast to the second half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century.) Over 
the second half of the twentieth century people in the U.S. have been exposed to a massive 
increase in the intensity of advertising: real advertising expenditure per capita grew at 4.5% 
p.a. and its effectiveness likely increased with the diffusion of television across households 
(Table I). 
Some earlier econometric work by Brack and Cowling [1983] revealed that the work 
year in the U.S. was 27% longer in 1976 than it would have been had not advertising 
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increased by the amount it did since 1919 (the advertising elasticity was estimated at 0.18, 
and the wage elasticity at -0.32 and there was a growth of 150% in advertising).4 There is 
also evidence that the participation of women in the U.S. market workforce has been 
increased by advertising (estimated elasticity 0.4), Giulietti and Meschi [1991]. 
 
III. Explanations of Trends in Working Time: Supply and Demand 
Brack and Cowling [1983] took the view that observations on work week (and work 
year) over a long period may reasonably be regarded as indicating supply side responses, 
citing the view of major analysts in the field, Lewis [1957] and Harberger [1964]. However 
since then we have the demand side explanation of American hours of work proposed by 
Schor [1991] 5: employers are able to force employees to work longer than they would ideally 
choose. This view gains support from the empirical work of Stewart and Swaffield [1997] 
who find that over a third of British male employees would prefer to work fewer hours at the 
prevailing hourly wage. The authors claim that job insecurity, fear of redundancy and scarcity 
of alternative job opportunities all encourage employees to accede to a firm’s requirement for 
hours above those preferred. Thus working hours could be determined by the employer. 
However we question whether or not this situation will figure prominently in the longer term: 
Gunderson and Riddell [1988] have argued “to a certain extent most firms may have an 
element of monopsony power in the short run, ….. However, it is unlikely that they would 
exercise this power in the long run because it would lead to costly problems of recruitment, 
turnover and morale.” Matthews et al., [1982] also claim that there is a good deal of evidence 
that, under normal economic conditions at least, workers have a significant amount of control 
over long-run movements in working time. Stewart and Swaffield [1997] themselves report 
that the previous literature on the U.S. does not accord with their results for the U.K.. Perhaps 
the pressure on the British to consume is less than that of the Americans, certainly the level of 
7 
advertising is.6  Fraser and Paton [2003] suggest that if we focus on the supply response, 
increased overtime hours may provide a further mechanism whereby production workers may 
exert at least some control over working time. To draw any conclusions from overtime hours, 
however, is not possible. On the demand side, overtime that is officially ‘voluntary’ may be 
viewed by the worker as a necessary strategy to maintain employment, as suspected by 
George [1997]. He suggests that a comprehensive study would be necessary to establish 
whether such considerations have caused ‘voluntary overtime’ to become more common. 
George [1997] argues that a widening gap between required work time and the 
worker’s preferred work time might be expected to have a positive effect on savings, given 
that the worker would be receiving income above that planned, but the evidence is strongly, 
to the contrary. No comparable rise in savings has occurred in the U.S. over the past 50 years: 
saving rates went from approximately 8.5 per cent of disposable income in the 1950s to 
around 5 per cent of disposable income by the late 1990s (see Figure II).  
Finally, despite Schor’s explanation of trends in work time in the U.S., other countries 
have been through the same economic changes and still take time off.7 Cross-national 
comparisons are valuable, not only because they tell us something about the different 
behavioural aspects in different societies but also because such comparisons can tell us how 
robust an underlying assumption is, and to what extent certain explanations can be 
generalised. Even if Americans work hours have not increased substantially in recent 
decades, U.S. workers tend to work more hours per year than workers in all other 
industrialised economies.8 While European workers have been reducing their hours of work, 
American workers maintain theirs. If this is the case, the long- run trend in hours worked is 
more likely to be dependent on supply-side factors. Specifically, desires for a high income or 
high consumption level may be caused by more extensive and more effective marketing 
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efforts (i.e. advertising), which may be seen as an important motivator with consequences for 
individual behaviour in terms of hours worked.  
The dominant popular assumption has usually been that as rates of pay rise, working 
hours will fall and more time will be left for other activities. However, this fails to 
acknowledge the fact that rising wages raise the opportunity cost of other uses of time, and 
thus the substitution effect may become larger than the income effect. Therefore, advertising 
may raise the opportunity cost of leisure, when so many material wants are unsatisfied, and 
this may dominate the assumed tendency of the income elasticity of the demand for leisure to 
be positive.  
We can save out of today’s earnings in order to work less or consume more in the 
future. However, Americans spend more time working than anyone else does. Americans 
increasingly spend a higher percentage of their earnings, and, with the explosion of 
household debt, a higher fraction of what they have not earned (see Figure II). In simpler 
terms, Americans may “spend to work” the term used by George [1997].9 Increased material 
needs cause the work hours eventually to be work that is necessary if changing tastes are to 
be adequately satisfied. Material desires and consumption aspirations are thus put forward to 
explain long working hours. This is an insidious cycle: in order to continue to consume at 
increasing levels, they must also continue to work at increasing levels. Therefore, the slow 
reduction or even increase in hours may be explained by a shift in preferences from leisure to 
the consumption of market goods and services.  
The notion that the intensity of advertising has influenced the income-leisure 
decisions of the U.S. labour force implies a particular view about the nature of advertising 
that is not widely accepted among economists. However, Galbraith [1958] suggested that 
advertising may have the effect of shifting preferences in favour of consumption in general 
rather than simply affecting relative consumption patterns. The economic effects of 
9 
advertising on consumption have not been studied to any significant extent. There is also very 
limited empirical research on advertising and labour supply in economics. This belief was 
first tested formally by Brack and Cowling [1983] for U.S. manufacturing production 
workers. They used OLS to estimate an aggregate labour supply function for U.S. hours 
worked between 1919 and 1976, and concluded that advertising had the effect of increasing 
the working year in the U.S. by about 27 per cent over that period. Another possible impact 
of advertising not to be ignored is the changing attitudes of women, which has lent even more 
status to working for an income and less status to housework. For example, Matthews et al. 
[1982, p. 459] suggest that the increase in the participation rate of women is due to an 
‘increase in family income aspirations and the tendency for goods and services that would 
formerly have been produced in the household to become cheaper and easier to acquire in the 
market’. Some evidence is provided by Giulietti and Meschi [1991], who find a positive 
association between female participation rates and advertising in the U.S.. More recently, the 
debate has been reopened by Fraser and Paton [2003] for both U.K. males and females from 
1952 to 1997. Advertising is shown to be positively associated with hours worked for both 
male and female series.  
So far, we have been reasoning in terms of marketing efforts to create material needed 
for consumption, which result in work time requirement of labour. However, there is another 
prediction that would have followed from encouraging policy of longer working hours for 
workers – as an alternative to focusing on changing tastes.10 For example, Prescott [2002, 
2004], observes that the large difference in the labour supply of France and the U.S. is due to 
differences in tax policy. The effective marginal tax rates are thus introduced in our analysis 
to capture this possible effect. The hours worked over the last 50 years in the U.S. reflects a 
choice that is likely to be made voluntarily by workers, a supply side explanation. The 
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remaining issue is how much of this choice comes from preferences and increasing income, 
and how much from tax policy. 
 
IV. Empirical Specification 
A. The Basic Model 
We consider the supply of labour (and the related demand for leisure) by considering 
leisure time as one of the features of the consumer’s utility function. The theory of utility-
maximising consumption and work decisions is that the consumer-worker acts as if 
maximising his/her utility function, whose arguments are goods and leisure, under the 
constraints imposed by a fixed amount of time and an exogenously-given wage rate and non-
wage income.  
Each individual’s consumer-worker optimisation problem is of the form: 
{ } { }HaCuMaxHC ),(,         (1) 
)(... IRHwYCts −+=    
where C is consumption of composite good ( )ic , H is hours of work, a is advertising 
intensity, { }HaCu ),( is the utility function, w is the gross wage, Y is non-wage income 
(independent of a working decision), and R is tax payments. The partial derivative of u with 
respect to H is negative, but positive with respect to C . An increase in advertising will 
decrease the marginal rate of substitution ( )m  between consumption ( )C  and leisure ( )H−1  
as the slope of the indifference curve shifts towards consumption and away from leisure.  
The interior solution (assuming that it exists) to the maximisation problem is: 
( ),,,, yahcmw −=      (2) 
In other words, hours of work are chosen such that the negative of the marginal rate of 
substitution for working hours is equal to the real wage rate. Solving equations (1) and (2) 
gives the demand function for the composite commodity and the supply function for labour11: 
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( )yawcc ,,=                                                      (3) 
( )yawhh ,,=                                                      (4)  
The labour supply function for both male and female is: 
,43210 tjftjtjmtjjjt taxwawh εβββββ +++++=                                    
Ttfmj ,...,1;, ==      (5) 
where h = hours worked; w = annual income; a = advertising expenditure; tax = 
effective marginal tax rate; ε  is an error term and all variables (except tax rates) are 
measured in natural logarithms. The fmj ,= subscripts pertain to male and female 
variables/parameters respectively. The t, t = 1,….T, subscript is time. Following Prescott 
[2002], distortions are introduced to the labour market by the intra-temporal tax wedges 
which distort the trade-off between consumption and leisure decision. Thus, an intra-temporal 
tax wedge term, taxt, is constructed to allow for these distortions in the labour market. 
The aim is to estimate a long-run supply side relationship. Unlike Fraser and Paton 
[2003] we measure the real wage in a long-run sense to exclude overtime premia. As argued 
above, although we claim to be estimating a long-run supply side relationship, it is clear that 
in times of recession, labour hours may be constrained. It is also evident that there are far 
more people working fewer hours than they would wish during economic downturns than 
during upturns.12 Although the economic recession and concomitant employment losses were 
felt by workers in all major industries, Coleman et. al., [1993] claim that trend movements in 
the hours of both males and females are largely unaffected when the effects of the business 
cycle are taken into account. This might be because the conclusion relies heavily on data 
pertaining to all employed workers. However, work behaviour in manufacturing industry is 
well-known to be cyclically sensitive, and indeed is sometimes used as a “leading” indicator 
of business conditions. No attempt to adjust for the business cycle in estimating changes in 
the allocation of time can seriously distort the trend in working hours. For example, if a later 
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year in a study happens to be a recession year, it would easily distort the upward trend in 
work time. Thus, a dummy term, dshort, is constructed to allow for years in which there was a 
particularly high level of short- time working. A full specification of the variables used is 
listed in the Data Appendix A. 
 
B.  Empirical results  
Univariate analysis: Time series plots for the logs of hours, wages, advertising and tax are 
provided in Figs. III-VIII and are indicative of univariate nonstationarity. The approach, in 
the first instance, is to perform augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) tests (Dickey and Fuller, 
[1979]) with a constant and trend included in the regressions. The unit root test conducted for 
both levels and for the first differences of each series. According to the results in Table III 
and IV, the null hypothesis of a unit root is accepted for the level series, but rejected for the 
first-differenced series at the 5 percent level of significance.  
Cointegration analysis: The VECMs, used in the analysis are given by 
ttit
k
i
itt uDyyy +Φ+ΔΓ+Π=Δ −
−
=
− ∑1
1
1    (6) 
t = 1,….T  
where the vector ty  is given by ( )′ttjtt taxawh ,,,  where ., fmj = We include an intercept in 
the cointegrating space as well as outside the cointegrating space. The deterministic 
component, ,tD is given by the column vector ( )′shortd (see also Appendix A). α,iΓ and β are, 
respectively ,nn× rn× and ,rn× ,0 nr << matrices such that ;βα ′=Π the r linear 
combinations of ,ty the cointegrating vectors, ,tyβ ′  are often interpreted as deviations from 
equilibrium andα is the matrix of adjustment or feedback coefficients, which measure how 
strongly the r stationary variables 1−′ tyβ  feedback onto the system. In addition, to facilitate 
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maximum likelihood analysis, it is assumed that tu  is an ... dii  normal distributed vector of 
errors, with a zero mean and a positive definite covariance matrix ,Σ and k is a constant 
integer. 
The standard approach to the Johansen [1988], and Johansen and Juselius [1990] 
cointegration analysis is to determine the VAR order, k, and the cointegration rank, r, 
sequentially. We determine the optimal lag length by using model selection criteria such as 
the Akaike’s (AIC) and Bayes Information Criteria (BIC). In addition the system LM statistic 
for first order autocorrelation and the system Jarque–Bera (JB) statistic for non-normal 
disturbances were estimated, for each k, to provide diagnostics of possible misspecification of 
the systems. The results of this analysis are reported in Table V and VI. The information from 
these statistics support the conclusion that the total yearly hours systems are well specified 
with k = 2. Conditional on k = 2, the likelihood ratio tests of cointegrating rank tend to 
support the finding of one cointegrating vectors (see Tables VII and VIII). Accordingly the 
estimated cointegrating vectors ( )βˆ  and adjustment coefficients ( )αˆ , for models with k = 2 
and r = 1, are presented in Tables VII and VIII. 
 
V. Discussion 
Advertising seems to have a significant impact in both the identified male-female, and 
manufacturing production workers long-run labour supply relations: the advertising 
coefficient is positive taking both weekly and yearly hours as the measure of labour supply. 
Using Johansen’s co-integration estimator, the advertising intensity elasticity is estimated to 
be 0.124 for male weekly hours, 0.171 for female weekly hours, and 0.263 for manufacturing 
production workers. For male weekly hours, male and female real wage elasticity is estimated 
to be 0.377 and 0.468, respectively. For female system, the female wage elasticity is not 
significant while, male real wage elasticity is estimated to be 0.243. For manufacturing 
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workers yearly hours, the real wage elasticity is 0.419.  Based on the present results, labour 
supply increases with the wage. In other words, an increase in income increases the 
opportunity cost of leisure (i.e., substitution effect outweighs income effect), which result in 
an increase of the number of work hours, even if leisure is a normal good. The finding that 
labour supply is positively related to advertising provides support to Brack and Cowling’s 
hypothesis that it has shifted the preferences of workers from leisure towards consumption. 
In addition the issue of the relationship between hours and tax has been addressed. 
We found a significant negative elasticity with respect to the tax rate but at a smaller order of 
magnitude compared with the advertising elasticity. Over the period 1962-2001, the impact 
of the effective marginal tax rate on labour supply has been small: elasticity of tax on labour 
supply is estimated to be 0.014 and 0.006 for male and female, respectively, while the effect 
of tax on manufacturing workers stands at 0.013. The finding that labour supply is negative 
related to tax rate provides support for Prescott’s hypothesis of tax distortion. However, the 
estimate of the advertising elasticity for labour supply is much greater than that for the 
elasticity of effective marginal tax rate; as a result, Prescott [2002, 2004] estimating might 
over-predict the effect of tax rate. Alesina et. al. [2005] also suggest that the effect of tax is 
too low to explain the differences in hours worked between U.S. and Europe. They claim that 
cross country differences in labour market regulations, advocated by unions explain the 
difference between U.S. and Europe, while this paper suggests that advertising may 
determine the underlying parameters. 
These results have important implications for the understanding of the determination 
of hours of work. In particular, they demonstrate the possibility that high observed hours of 
work may be the result of pressure from employees who wish to increase their earnings to 
satisfy their increasing desire for consumption. However, these should not be treated as 
radically opposed to Schor’s explanations. The proverbial grain of truth can reside in each.  
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VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have argued that the high U.S. hours of work appears due to a 
difference in preferences between the U.S. and elsewhere, as a result of a greater intensity of 
advertising in the U.S., rather than simply due to tax differences. The results demonstrate the 
possibility that high observed hours of work was the result of a desire of workers to work 
longer due to a shift in their preferences from leisure to increased consumption, caused by the 
huge increase in advertising.  
Finally, if policy-makers are concerned with the negative externalities of long 
working hours (for example on family life), the actions of the federal government in placing a 
legal maximum on work hours may be appropriate. However, such measures are less 
appropriate if their aim is to protect workers from undue managerial pressure. Many people 
believe that Americans are working long hours and that the federal government should 
mandate a reduction in work hours. The big problem for these policies, however, is that by 
and large Americans do not really want more time off. Although it appears that Americans 
generally do not want longer vacations or shorter working weeks because they are caught in a 
spending cycle, this may not deter the advocates of laws forcing Americans to work less. For 
many, this is an ideological issue divorced from economics or even the actual preferences of 
workers. Ultimately, it is up to workers to decide whether they prefer more money or less 
work. In the end, the real question is not whether people are working longer, but whether they 
are happy with whatever work arrangements they have. At least for now, it is fairly clear that 
the shift in American's labour supply curve is caused by American's willingness to work more 
rather than by a reaction to having to work more.  
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Table I: U.S. Advertising Expenditure; Ten-Year Averages, 1941-2000 
Years Advertising 
Expenditure 
($bn) 
Advertising Messages a 
(Real Advertising 
Expenditure) 
($ 1982bn.) 
Advertising Intensity 
(Real Advertising per 
Capita) 
($1982) 
1941-1950 3.588 15.977 112 
1951-1960 9.240 29.857 177 
1961-1970 15.748 41.783 213 
1971-1980 33.399 52.709 242 
1981-1990 96.916 85.076 353 
1991-2000 175.985 118.247 439 
a Advertising Messages figures are derived from deflating advertising expenditure by the GDP Price Deflator, 
based on 1982. 
b Advertising Intensity measures the advertising messages that audiences received. Advertising Intensity figures 
are derived by deflating real advertising expenditure by population size. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, various issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I: U.S. Personal Savings Ratio 
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Figure II: Household Debt and Mortgage Debt to Income Ratios 
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Fig. III. Graphs of Male and Female (log) weekly hours
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Fig. IV. Graphs of (log) Male and Female Income
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Fig V. Graph of Manufacturing Workers (log) Total Yearly Hours
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Fig. VI. Graph of (log) Manufacturing Workers Real Wages
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Fig. VII. Graph of (log) Advertising Intensity
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Fig. VIII. Graph of Effective Marginal Tax Rate
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Appendix A: 
Data Description  
Unless otherwise stated, all variables are measured in natural logarithms. 
Labour market variables 
w
mH ,
w
mfH : Average hours worked per week by non-agricultural male and total (male and 
female combined) 16 years and over workers respectively. 
yH : average hours worked per year by manufacturing production workers.  
mw , fw : Real median income before tax for full-time, year-round workers (15 years and 
over), respectively. Nominal wages are deflated by the consumer price index (CPI-U 
1982=100). U.S. Census Bureau Historical Income Table P-36. 
w : real hourly wage rate of manufacturing production workers. Nominal wages are deflated 
by the consumer price index (CPI-U 1982=100).  
Other variables  
a : U.S. annual aggregate advertising expenditure per capita at constant prices. The data used 
for advertising are taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States and refer to the 
total of all advertising expenditure in the economy. Real advertising  expenditures are 
deflated by GDP Price Deflator (1982 =100). 
shortd : define a recession in terms of two consecutive quarters of decline in real GDP. These 
years are 1947, 1949, 1953, 1958, 1970, 1974, 1980, 1982, 1991 and 2001.  
tax: effective marginal tax rate. Following Prescott (2004), we define the effective marginal 
tax rate as .100
1
×⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+
ct
ctht
τ
ττ  ctτ  is a consumption tax, and htτ  is a marginal tax rate on labour 
income.  Tax rates are expressed in percentage points (e.g. 36.5) . 
Data sources:  
Labour market data are taken from the following sources: the Bureau of the Census, Annual 
Survey of Manufactures.  
Advertising, Population, Real GDP, GDP Price Deflator and CPI-U data are taken from 
Statistical Abstract of the United States (various issues) published by U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce, Bureau of Census, Washington, D.C. 
Income and consumption tax, U.S. Dept. of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA 
table.  
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Unit Root Tests: 
The ADF regressions are given by 
t
p
i
ititt xtxx εγααα +Δ+++=Δ ∑
=
−−
1
2110  
where p is set at the highest significant lag order from the partial autocorrelation 
function of txδ . 
Table III: Male-Female System Weekly Hours: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
 Variable No. of lags (p) 0: 10 =αH  0: 210 == ααH  
Levels:    
mh  1 -2.652 -2.497 
fh  0 -1.182 -2.996 
mw  1 -2.878 -2.856 
fw  0 -1.859 -2.295 
a  0 -0.523 -2.053 
tax  0 -1.083 -2.365 
First-Differenced:   
mh  1 -4.815** -4.644** 
fh  0 -6.081** -6.332** 
mw  1 -3.846** -4.047* 
fw  0 -4.163** -4.184* 
a  0 -4.458** -4.339** 
tax  0 -5.694** -5.616** 
Notes: *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) levels respectively. 
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Table IV: Manufacturing Workers System Yearly Hours: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Unit Root Tests 
 Variable No. of lags (p) 0: 10 =αH  0: 210 == ααH  
Levels:    
yh  0 -2.600 -2.599 
w  2 -4.303** -2.834 
a  0 -0.925 -2.452 
tax  0 -0.821 -2.633 
First-Differenced:   
yh  0 -9.462** -9.403** 
w  1 -3.643** -5.273** 
a  0 -5.573** -5.516** 
tax  0 -6.627**  -6.565** 
Notes: *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) levels respectively. 
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Table V: Male-Female System Weekly Hours: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
Male Female Lag (k) 
AIC BIC LM JB AIC BIC LM JB 
1 -35.653 -34.097 0.022 0.278 -35.393 -33.837 0.012 0.308 
2 -36.171 -33.504* 0.167 0.258 -35.732 -33.066* 0.248 0.252 
3 -36.813 -33.036 0.168 0.163 -35.379 -31.602 0.1945 0.200 
4 -37.937 -33.049 0.827 0.289 -36.763 -31.875 0.792 0.314 
5 39.241* -33.241 0.630 0.836 38.008* -32.009 0.4923 0.708 
Notes: 1. * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
2. LM ∼ ( )252χ  under the null of no first order autocorrelation 
3. JB ∼ ( )102χ  under the null of normality. 
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Table VI: Manufacturing Workers System Yearly Hours: VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria 
 Lag (k) AIC BIC LM Jarque-Bera 
1 -27.491 -26.582 0.0394 0.4052 
2 -27.579 -26.064* 0.2460 0.5210 
3 -27.732 -25.611 0.0235 0.3094 
4  -27.837* -25.109 0.3241 0.5532 
Notes: 1. * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
2. LM ∼ ( )162χ  under the null of no first order autocorrelation. 
3. JB ∼ ( )82χ  under the null of normality. 
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Table VII: Male-Female System Weekly Hours: Johansen Cointegration Test 
Male System Female System Hypothesised  
No. of CE(s) 
( )1=k  
Trace 
Statistic 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
Trace 
Statistic 
Max-Eigen 
Statistic 
0:0 =rH  82.347* 42.993* 83.216* 40.622* 
1:0 ≤rH  39.354 23.625 42.593 42.627 
2:0 ≤rH  15.728 11.099 17.966 11.956 
3:0 ≤rH  4.629 4.459 6.009 5.569 
4:0 ≤rH  0.169 0.169 0.440 0.440 
Notes: *(**) denotes significance at the 5% (1%) levels respectively. 
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Table VIII: Manufacturing Workers System Yearly Hours: Johansen Cointegration Test  
Hypothesised Yearly Hours 
No. of CE(s) Trace Max-Eigen ( )1=k  Statistic Statistic 
0:0 =rH   50.615*  26.599 
1:0 ≤rH  24.016  14.678 
2:0 ≤rH   9.337  9.212 
3:0 ≤rH   0.125  0.125 
Notes: *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
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Table IX: Male-Female System Weekly Hours: Standardised Cointegrating Vectors and Adjustment 
Coefficients 
Normalized cointegrating coefficients: β  (std.err. in parentheses) 
 MALE 
 HOURS 
FEMALE 
 HOURS 
  
MALE 
WAGE 
0.377 
(0.144) 
0.243 
(0.085) 
 
  
FEMALE 
WAGE 
0.468 
(0.171) 
0.035  
(0.095) 
 
  
ADVERTISING 0.124 
(0.056) 
0.171 
(0.033) 
 
  
TAX -0.014 
(0.002) 
-0.006 
(0.001) 
 
  
Notes: Female Wage is not significant. 
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Table X: Manufacturing Workers Yearly-Hour Systems: Standardised Cointegrating Vectors  
and Adjustment Coefficients 
Normalized cointegrating coefficients: β  (std.err. in parentheses) 
 YEARLY HOURS 
WAGE 0.419 
(0.107) 
 
ADVERTISING  0.263 
(0.051) 
 
TAX -0.013 
(0.003) 
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1 Despite Galbraith [1967] having wrote persuasively on the subject. Also Rothschild [1942] and Baran and 
Sweezy [1966]. 
2 Blanchard [2004] is not convinced by such calculations: he considers Prescott’s assumption about the elasticity 
of labour supply far too high. 
3 In fact, 85% of American workers say they want more time with their family, and 46% of people want ‘much 
more time’ at home. 
4 Clearly this is a quite simplistic interpretation of the econometric results: it is simply intended as a rough guide 
to the possible quantitative significance of the effects. 
5 Schor argued that companies have shifted to having employees work overtime to handle extra demands, rather 
than hire extra personnel. Initially, overtime was intended to be more expensive to the employers forcing them 
to hire more workers and lessen the other workers’ hours. However, this concept backfired. For many employers 
paying workers overtime is cheaper than hiring more workers and paying for their benefits. 
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6 Bell and Freeman [1995] show that, although Americans work more hours than German workers (and workers 
in other European countries), they are still more likely to prefer additional hours than German workers are. 
Approximately 33 per cent of Americans want to work more hours and only 6 per cent fewer hours. Only 14 per 
cent of Germans, on the other hand, would like to work more and 10 percent would like to work less. 
7 American vacations average 8.1 days after a year on the job and only 10.2 days after three years, according to 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics [2003]. While many European workers in countries including France, where 
workers have a 35-hour workweek and five weeks of vacation. 
8 The report, issued by the International Labor Organization [2002], found that Americans added nearly a full 
week to their work year during the 1990's, climbing to 1,979 hours in 2001, up 36 hours from 1990. That means 
Americans who are employed are putting in nearly 49½ weeks a year on the job. Americans work 137 hours, or 
about three and one-half weeks, more a year than Japanese workers, 260 hours (about 6½ weeks) more a year 
than British workers and 499 hours (about 12½ weeks) more a year than German workers. The Japanese had 
long been at the top for the number of hours worked, but in the mid-1990's the United States surpassed Japan, 
and since then it has pulled farther ahead. 
9 The workers did experience increased preferences for marketed goods and services as a consequence of greater 
income that came with the longer work hours. 
10 Since the early 1980s, there have been marked changes in tax and welfare policies in the U.S.. For example, 
the number of tax brackets sharply diminished with the passage of the federal tax reform in 1986. In-work 
benefits increasingly became the main platform for encouraging low-income families to increase their work 
effort and incomes. In 1996, the U.S. adopted sweeping reforms in its welfare systems; all were designed to 
induce recipients to support themselves through work (see also Blundell and MaCurdy [1999]).  
11  See, for example, Pencavel [1986].  
12 During recessions, employers are no longer indifferent about hours of work; cutting overtime and putting 
workers on short time may be preferable alternatives to redundancies, forcing workers off their long-run supply 
schedule. 
